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In this article, the author considers the implications for China of the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) initiative and the international implications of China’s BEPS measures.
1. Introduction: BEPS as a Global Issue
“BEPS” refers to the phenomenon of base erosion and profit shifting. This abbreviation has already found a prominent
place in the tax lexicon, and often requires no translation in non-English publications.[1] BEPS also refers to the projects
addressing the phenomenon of artificial shifting of profit. The most notable project is that initiated by the G20 and led
by the OECD (the “BEPS initiative”). Since the initial BEPS report of 13 February 2013,[2] the OECD has released a
detailed Action Plan,[3] public discussion drafts and deliverables related to the various Actions at a speed unprecedented
in the history of international taxation. The project of the UN Subcommittee on BEPS Issues for Developing Countries
(the “UN Subcommittee”) is parallel to, and coordinated with, the OECD’s work, and is intended to complement from
a capacity development angle the BEPS initiative by focusing on the needs and priorities of developing countries. The
UN Subcommittee has sought responses from developing nations on how BEPS affects them, what prevents them
from protecting their tax bases and their views on the issues raised in the BEPS initiative.[4] The UN is in the process of
producing a collection of papers on tax base protection in developing countries.[5] Many national governments have also
introduced measures to counter BEPS.[6]
The problem of BEPS is described in the Action Plan as follows:
No or low taxation is not per se a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with practices that
artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it.[7]
From the perspective of national governments, a country’s tax base is eroded when profits that should be taxable in that
country are shifted elsewhere. From the perspective of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that adopt BEPS strategies,
there is nothing illegal about this. BEPS highlights two conflicts: (1) a government-to-government conflict regarding
sharing the international tax resources or tax base arising from cross-border activities; and (2) a government-to-taxpayer
conflict in the sense that taxpayers want to minimize their tax liability in a country, whereas the governments want the
opposite.
The problems addressed by the BEPS initiative are not new. They are inevitable because of the design of the
international tax system. International tax rules primarily originate from domestic tax laws and a network of bilateral tax
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Canada. This article is part of a research project on tax transplants supported
by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SHHRC). The author wishes to thank her co-
investigator, Professor Thaddeus Hwong, for his collaboration and her students, Stephen Ji and Huaning (Christina) Li for their
research assistance. She is indebted to Professor Wei Cui for his comments on the draft of this paper. She is solely responsible for any
remaining errors. She can be contacted at JinyanLi@osgoode.yorku.ca.
1. See, for example, SAT, State Administration of Taxation Regulates the Administration of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, available at
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810214/n810641/n810697/n813233/c1395201/content.html (in Chinese).
2. OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting p. 15 (OECD 2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
3. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
4. See www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax-committee/tc-beps.html.
5. At the time of the writing of this article, the UN Handbook on Tax Base Protection for Developing Countries was expected to be issued in spring
2015. The project was led by Brian Arnold and Hugh Ault, and contributed to by a number of scholars worldwide, including the author. See
www.un.org/esa/ffd/topics/capacity-development/capacity-development-tax-cooperation/cd-tbp.html.
6. Examples include the UK diverted profits tax proposal in UK: Finance Bill (2015).
7. OECD, supra n. 3, at p. 10.
© Copyright 2015  IBFD: No part of this information may be reproduced or distributed without permission of IBFD.
Disclaimer: IBFD will not be liable for any damages arising from the use of this information.
treaties. There is no international tax organization that oversees tax matters. Consequently, there are gaps and overlaps
between national tax laws that cannot be adequately addressed by tax treaties. For example, tax jurisdictional rules are
based on the residence of taxpayers or the source of income, both of which leave MNEs with room for self-selection.
Transfer pricing rules regard members of an economically integrated firm, i.e. an MNE, as separate and independent
entities and respect intra-group contracts and other legal arrangements in allocating profits for national tax purposes.
The primary objective of current international tax rules is to prevent double taxation, but there is no agreement that
preventing double non-taxation is a purpose of tax treaties. These problems are exacerbated by the globalization of
national economies, integrated cross-border business structures adopted by MNEs and the digital economy. MNEs can
take advantage of these to minimize their global tax burdens.
BEPS became a global political issue in the past few years primarily due to the global financial crisis of 2007-09, public
outcry regarding the aggressive tax planning of some MNEs and growing frustration about the increasing inequality
between the wealthy 1% and the rest of the world. The G20/OECD partnership, to some extent supported by the UN,
combines political influence with technical expertise and has the potential to implement fundamental international tax
reforms. Perhaps, for the first time in history, international tax reform is a global political issue that is important to both
the public and policymakers, taxpayers and tax practitioners. Countries that had no say in the past may now partake in
the BEPS initiative. For countries such as China and other emerging economies, the stakes are high and the opportunity
precious.
This article discusses what BEPS means for China and recent Chinese actions in this regard. It suggests that China’s
involvement in the BEPS initiative and its unilateral BEPS measures indicate a transformation of China from a norm-
taker to a norm-shaker. China’s actions are likely to have significant implications for the development of international tax
system.
2. Implications of BEPS for China
2.1. BEPS is real
China is believed by some to be one of the major victims of BEPS.[8] This belief is not officially shared by the Chinese
State Administration of Taxes (SAT), although the SAT acknowledged the existence of BEPS in China in its response to
the UN Subcommittee’s question “How does base erosion and profit shifting affect your country”:
China currently does not have a system which quantitatively analyzes the base erosion in our country. Yet, we
do find, and it is obvious, that the major threat China faces is that many MNE groups have shifted their profits by
means of tax planning and transfer pricing.[9]
There are several reasons for suspecting that China is a victim of BEPS. Given that BEPS concerns shifting profits from
countries where business activities take place, i.e. production and sales, to low-tax jurisdictions and that China is a major
producer of goods and market for goods and services and has a corporate income tax rate of 25%, BEPS is a real issue
for China. In addition, more than 50% of the foreign direct investment into China originated from low-tax jurisdictions,
including the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands, and many Chinese companies making outbound investments use
holding vehicles in tax havens.[10]
China identifies the most common BEPS practices and structures as being:[11]
8. For instance, Mr Jiang Yuesheng of Jiangsu Provincial State Tax Bureau has stated that China is “the largest victim of BEPS in the world” on the
basis of a research report conducted by an international expert without disclosing the name of the expert or the source of the report. See The
Nature of BEPS and Our Response Strategy (5 June 2014), available at www.wendangwang.com/doc/c2b322abc3b8dfa8e90f4110 (in Chinese)
[hereinafter: “Jiang Speech”]. More research is needed to establish the extent of BEPS in China. BEPS practices in China are presumably
different from those in the OECD countries. For example, China’s capital control regime and exchange control regime probably limit the use of
debt to shift profits from China.
9. See China’s reply to the BEPS Questionnaire of the UN Subcommittee, available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ta-BEPS-
CommentsChina.pdf [hereinafter: “UN Response re BEPS”].
10. D. Qiu, Collecting Unpaid Tax Offshore: Caribbean Tax Havens and Foreign Direct Investment in China, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2014), Journals
IBFD.
11. UN Response re BEPS, supra n. 9.
© Copyright 2015  IBFD: No part of this information may be reproduced or distributed without permission of IBFD.
Disclaimer: IBFD will not be liable for any damages arising from the use of this information.
– MNE groups adopt transfer pricing principles and methodologies in intra-group dealings to reduce the profits of their
Chinese subsidiaries; and
– MNE groups establish shell companies with no genuine economic substance in the low-tax jurisdictions and tax
havens to shift profits.
Specifically, BEPS practices include using arrangements or structures to: (1) avoid Chinese-source rules; (2) make tax-
deductible payments to non-resident related parties; (3) use transfer pricing methodologies to shift value to offshore risks
and intangible properties; and (4) use intermediaries in treaty states to benefit from Chinese tax treaties.
Recently, the SAT has publicly noted how MNEs conduct themselves in China, resulting in avoidance of Chinese taxes.
For example, Chinese subsidiaries of MNEs are often treated as contract manufacturers and receive low-profit margins
for their contract manufacturing function, while at the same time they claim tax incentives for “high and new technology
enterprises” under the Enterprise Income Tax Law (the “EIT Law”).[12] The MNE has healthy profits but the Chinese
subsidiaries of the MNE report losses in spite of the fact that they are major manufacturing centres and China is a major
market for MNE products. Foreign-based MNEs have often implemented transfer pricing policies “that are sensitive to
developed countries’ transfer pricing rules and nuances”[13] as opposed to those in China.
BEPS is not limited to foreign-based MNEs. Chinese enterprises and individuals have engaged in BEPS to transfer
Chinese profit offshore, often to holding entities in tax havens.
2.2. BEPS is unfair
China regards BEPS as being fundamentally unfair. The unfairness lies in the mismatch between the location of taxation
rights and the substantive economic activities. The right to tax business profits should belong to the jurisdiction where
the government creates the necessary business and investment environment for MNEs and business activities are
conducted, i.e.:
For many years, China has consistently been one of the world’s largest recipients of foreign direct investment,
played the role of a “factory of the world”; in recent years, with the rapid economic development and consistent
increase in people’s purchasing power, China has also become the “market of the world”. As a base for production
and consumption, China has created and contributed enormous value for the world, and China’s value-contribution
should be reflected in the allocation of profits arising from cross-border economic activities.[14]
Specifically, BEPS highlights the unfairness in sharing the tax base between developed countries and developing
countries, i.e.:
For a long time, in their competition with developing countries for more tax resources (tax base), developed
countries have obtained most of the benefits generated by MNEs by relying on their dominant position in formulating
the rules and superiority in technology and intangible property, while developing countries have obtained a very
small share of the profits even though they have paid a price [for such profits] through providing huge market, cheap
labour, using energy resources and damaging the environment.[15]
12. CN: Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated by the 5th Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, 16
March, 2007, art. 30 [hereinafter: “EIT Law”]. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the EIT Law were promulgated by the State Council on
6 December 2007 [hereinafter: “EIT Regulations”]. See China Country Practice, United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing sec. 10.3,
available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf [hereinafter: “UN TP Manual”].
13. UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at para. 10.3.8.3.
14. Interview with Deputy Commissioner Zhang Zhiyong, Strengthening Global Tax Cooperation and Combating International Tax Avoidance and Tax
Evasion (8 Dec. 2014), available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810724/c1353155/content.html (in Chinese) [hereinafter: “Interview with
Deputy Commissioner”].
15. Jiangsu Provincial Office of SAT, Administration Plan for International Taxation Compliance in 2014-2015 and Jiangsu State Tax Bureau,
Prevention of Three Mismatches and Guarding against Four Matches (13 August 2014), available at http://www.shui5.cn/article/13/73408.html (in
Chinese) [hereinafter: “Jiangsu STB Paper”].
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2.3. BEPS is an opportunity for reform
The problems in the current international tax system were transplanted into China when China created its income tax
system.[16] China could not create an international tax system that deviated from the international norm. By default, China
was a norm-taker. As in other countries, the system has proven to be fertile ground for BEPS.
As the international tax rules were developed largely for an industrial economy, their defects were revealed when, in
a short time, the Chinese economy rapidly transformed from an agricultural one to a mixed agricultural, industrial and
information economy. The frustration with these flawed rules is perhaps intensified by the fact that their underlying values
are not necessarily compatible with the Chinese ones.
BEPS provides an opportunity for reforming the international tax rules.[17] China regards the BEPS initiative as an
opportunity to improve basic fairness in the international tax system, i.e. the “G20 Tax Reform”.[18]
2.4. BEPS brings China to the table
The BEPS initiative brought China to the table where international tax rules are debated and their future direction is
mapped. China had previously aired its views, but primarily through the United Nations.[19] China has played a role in
developing international tax rules through the UN Committee of Experts on Tax Matters (the “UN Committee”) and its non-
member country status as regards the OECD Model.[20] It is the BEPS initiative that enables China to have a seat at the
table.
As a member of the G20, China presumably played an important role in putting BEPS on the global agenda. According
to the SAT, as a partner of the OECD, China has played a significant role in developing the BEPS initiative. By the end
of 2014, SAT representatives had attended 42 BEPS meetings, submitted 52 position papers to the OECD and made
“important contributions” to the completion of several BEPS 2014 Deliverables.[21] President Xi Jinping raised the BEPS
issue during the G20 Summit on 16 November 2014 and regarded BEPS as a risk to global economic recovery.[22]
2.5. BEPS means action
Given the changes brought about by BEPS, China is leveraging off the BEPS outcomes to solidify its thinking on
international tax rules and to introduce new enforcement measures. The SAT has developed a plan to translate the
outcomes of the Action Plan into measures in China.[23] Notable BEPS measures include: (1) the General Anti-Avoidance
Rule (GAAR);[24] (2), the Offshore Indirect Transfers Circular (2015);[25] (3) Beneficial Ownership Circulars;[26] (4) the
Outbound Payments Notice (2015);[27] and (5) Special Tax Adjustment Measures (2009),[28] i.e. transfer pricing and other
anti-avoidance rules.
16. See J. Li, Tax Transplants and the Critical Role of Processes: A Case Study of China, Osgoode Leg. Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper 84
(2015), available at http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/84/, originally published in 3 J. Chinese Tax & Policy, Special issue, pp.
85-139 (2013).
17. Jiangsu STB Paper, supra n. 15.
18. SAT, Tax System Reform, Through Strategizing One Area to Mobilize the Entire System (31 Dec. 2014), available at www.chinatax.gov.cn/
n840303/c1440429/content.html (in Chinese) [hereinafter: “Strategizing One Area to Mobilize the Entire System”].
19. For instance, in 2013, China published its views on transfer pricing in UN TP Manual, supra n. 12.
20. Most recently, OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentaries (15 July 2014), Models IBFD.
21. Strategizing One Area to Mobilize the Entire System, supra n. 18.
22. President Xi urged strengthening global tax cooperation, combating international tax avoidance and evasion and assisting developing countries
and low-income countries to increase their capacity to collect taxes (see Interview with Deputy Commissioner, supra n. 14).
23. Strategizing One Area to Mobilize the Entire System, supra n. 18.
24. SAT, Administrative Measures on the General Anti-Avoidance Rules (Trial), SAT Order No. 32 (2 Dec. 2014) [hereinafter: “GAAR Measures”]. See
further replies to questions from the press regarding Administrative Measures for the GAAR (Trial) by in-charge SAT officials (SAT GAAR Q&A),
posted on the SAT website on 12 December 2014 and Discussion draft of Administrative Measures on the General Anti-Avoidance Rules (Draft
GAAR administrative measures) issued for public comment by the SAT on 3 July 2014.
25. SAT, Notice on Several Issues Related to Enterprise Income Tax Application to Indirect Transfers of Property between Non-resident Enterprises,
Gong Gao [2015] No. 7 (3 Feb. 2015) [hereinafter: “Offshore Indirect Transfers Circular (2015)”].
26. See infra ns. 51-54.
27. SAT, Notice on Enterprise Income Tax Issues related to Payments of Expenses by Enterprises to Offshore Related Parties, Gong Gao [2015] No.
16 (18 Mar. 2015) [hereinafter: “Outbound Payments Notice (2015)”]. Before the publication of this document, see SAT, Notice of Anti-Avoidance
Examination on Significant Outbound Payments, Shuifabanfa [2014] No. 146, Circular [2014] No. 146 (29 July 2014) [hereinafter: “Notice [2014]
No. 146”].
28. SAT, Measures for the Implementation of the Special Tax Adjustment (trial)], Guo Shui Fa [2009] No. 2, (10 Jan. 2009, effective 1 Jan. 2009
[hereinafter: “Special Tax Adjustment Measures (2009)”].
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The above measures are based on the GAAR[29] and the transfer pricing rules[30] in the EIT Law. They guide the audit and
assessment practices of the SAT. Under Chinese law, the SAT enjoys a wide range of delegated authority to introduce
rules and measures for the implementation of provisions in the EIT Law and EIT Regulations. There is no judicial
oversight in this area. The doctrine of “substance over form” in applying statutory provisions also has a long history in
China and has been incorporated into the Chinese anti-avoidance legislation. Consequently, local tax authorities have
acted on the directions of the SAT.
3. BEPS Measures in China
3.1. The GAAR
3.1.1. Overview
The GAAR is the first set of rules introduced by the SAT following President Xi’s remarks at the 2014 G20 Summit. The
timing of the official introduction of these measures indicates the importance of the GAAR as an anti-BEPS instrument.
The accompanying news release was entitled “Implementing G20 Tax Reform and Forcefully Attacking International Tax
Avoidance: State Administration of Taxation Standardises the Administration of the GAAR”.[31] The GAAR is believed to
be the right instrument to counter BEPS, as it shares the same objective as the BEPS initiative, i.e. that of ensuring that
the tax reporting of business profits is not artificially segregated from the location of business activities. The reasonable
business purpose test and the concept of substance over form or economic substance underlie the GAAR.
Under Chinese law, the GAAR is a measure of last resort in addressing tax avoidance transactions. If a transaction is
subject to any of the specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs), such as transfer pricing, thin capitalization or controlled
foreign corporation (CFC) rules, the SAAR is applied first.[32] The SAT has applied the GAAR to address perceived
base erosion problems arising from realization of economic values accrued in China through offshore transfers and the
improper use of tax treaties.
3.1.2. The provision
Article 47 of the EIT Law states that:
[i]f an enterprise enters into any business arrangement without a reasonable business purpose that results in a
reduction of taxable revenue or income, the tax authority has the power to make adjustments based on reasonable
methods (author’s unofficial translation).[33]
The phrase “business arrangements without a reasonable business purpose” is defined in article 120 of the EIT
Regulations to mean “arrangements whose main purpose is to reduce, avoid or defer tax payments”.
There is no case law interpreting the meaning of the GAAR. According to the SAT’s GAAR Measures, the GAAR applies
only to cross-border transactions. It does not apply to transactions that are purely domestic or to non-compliance
behaviour amounting to tax evasion or tax fraud. However, certain offshore transactions between non-resident enterprises
are potentially subject to the GAAR if the transactions involve the transfer of taxable Chinese property (see section
3.2.2.).[34] The GAAR may apply to cross-border transactions covered by tax treaties. Generally, the GAAR can be
invoked to prevent arrangements or transactions that result in: (1) the abuse of tax preferences; (2) the abuse of tax
treaties; (3) the abuse of corporate forms; (4) tax avoidance using tax havens; and (5) other arrangements without
reasonable business purposes.[35]
29. Art. 47 EIT Law.
30. Id., at art. 41.
31. See www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-12/14/content_2790846.htm (in Chinese).
32. Art. 6 GAAR Measures, supra n. 24.
33. If the GAAR is applied, in addition to unpaid taxes, there is an additional interest charge in respect of the underpaid tax. This charge is computed
on a daily basis from 1 June following the tax year to which the tax is attributed, through the date of tax payment. The interest charges cannot be
deducted in computing taxable income.
34. Art. 2 GAAR Measures, supra n. 24.
35. Art. 92 Special Tax Adjustment Measures (2009), supra n. 28.
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3.1.3. Business purpose and economic substance tests
The GAAR applies to a transaction or arrangement if it is undertaken to obtain a tax benefit and has no reasonable
business purpose.
The term “tax benefit” is interpreted by the SAT as meaning a reduction, exemption or deferral of tax payable by an
enterprise.[36]
According to the GAAR Measures, if the sole or main purpose of an arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit, the
arrangement is not undertaken for a reasonable business purpose. The GAAR provisions in the EIT Law and the EIT
Regulations do not specify whether the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit must be the sole or primary purpose of the
transaction or arrangement. Article 4 of the GAAR Measures clarifies the purpose test to mean the “sole” (唯一) “”or
“primary” （主要）purpose.[37] In making the determination, all relevant circumstances in a specific case, including the
economic substance of an arrangement, must be considered.
The concept of “economic substance” plays a key role in applying the GAAR, even though its meaning remains
undefined. Without explicitly stating that tax law provisions are intended to apply to transactions with economic substance,
the SAT appears to assume the existence of such an intention.[38] Artificial transactions and entities lacking economic
substance are, therefore, considered to be abusive. In applying the economic substance doctrine, the SAT regards
the following to be relevant: (1) the form and substance; (2) the creation time and implementation period; (3) the
implementation method; (4) the relationship between each of the steps or components; (5) the changes in each party’s
financial situation; and (6) the tax consequences, in respect of an arrangement.[39]
3.1.4. GAAR adjustments
When the GAAR applies to a transaction, the tax consequences of the transaction are determined according to the
substance-over-form principle using similar arrangements with reasonable business purposes and economic substance
as the benchmark.[40] Specific methods of adjustments include: (1) recharacterizing all or part of the transaction;
(2) disregarding the counterparty of the transaction for tax purposes or to deem a specific counterparty and other
counterparties as one single entity; (3) recharacterizing the income, deduction, tax incentive or foreign tax credit or the
reallocation of the impugned amount among the relevant parties to the transaction; and (4) applying another reasonable
method. These methods provide tax officials with specific guidance. Once the GAAR is invoked, the tax benefit arising
from the avoidance arrangement is thereby denied.[41]
3.2. Offshore indirect transfers
3.2.1. Overview
Erosion of the source country’s tax base through offshore indirect transfers is not among the issues addressed by
the BEPS initiative. For many developing countries, however, this is an important issue. It is the subject of a study
commissioned by the UN subcommittee.[42] Examples of such transactions are described as follows:
Mauritania: A Canadian company effectively acquired an interest in a large gold mining project [in Mauritania] from
another Canadian company via a transaction in the Bahamas in 2010, with a potential capital gain of US$4 billion.
No tax was collected on the transaction in Mauritania.
Mozambique: In 2011 a change in ownership of mining projects in Mozambique was achieved through the sale,
on the Australian stock market, of shares in the mining company holding interests in the projects. The value of the
transaction was around US$4 billion. No tax was collected on the transaction in Mozambique. In the case of the
36. Art. 3 GAAR Measures, supra n. 24. Presumably, any increase in a tax refund would also be treated as a tax benefit.
37. Supra n. 24.
38. The principle of economic substance is widely supported in the Chinese tax literature. See, for example, Liu Yingchun, Relevant Legal Issues
regarding Taxation according to the Principle of Substance”, 113 Rev. Inst. Pol. China Youth 1, (2012), available at www.cesruc.org/uploads/
soft/130320/1-1303201Z019.pdf (in Chinese).
39. Art. 93 Special Tax Adjustment Measures, supra n. 28.
40. Article 93 of the Special Tax Adjustment Measures, supra n. 28, and article 5 of the GAAR Measures, supra n. 24.
41. Art. 94 Special Tax Adjustment Measures, supra n. 28.
42. See W. Cui, Taxation of Capital Gains, Papers on Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries (Sept. 2014), available at
www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/20140923_Paper_TaxationCapitalGains.pdf.
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sales of shares in the exploration concessions in the Rovuma basin, the authorities have collected US$1.1 billion
in capital gains taxes in 2013-14. Changes were made to the tax code, on January 1, 2014, to ensure taxation of
capital gains resulting from a direct or indirect transfer between non-residents of assets located in Mozambique
(International Monetary Fund, 2014).[43]
In China, offshore indirect transfers generally refer to transfers of shares of a non-resident holding company by its
shareholders where the holding company owns equity investments in Chinese enterprises. Gains from such transfers
are technically not taxable in China, but are economically sourced in China and are believed to fall within the Chinese tax
base.
3.2.2. Source rules for capital gains
Under the EIT Law, capital gains are subject to withholding taxes which apply to passive investment income.[44] In contrast
to passive investment income that is taxed on a gross basis, capital gains are taxed on a net basis. The source of the
capital gain is defined in article 7 of the EIT Regulations as follows:
– for immovable property, the source is the place where the property is located;
– for movable property, the source is where the enterprise or the establishment or site of the non-resident that
transfers the property is located; and
– for equity investments, the source is where the enterprise invested is located.
According to these rules, the source of gains from the transfer of shares of a Chinese company is China. There are
no “look-through” rules in the EIT Law. Consequently, for offshore indirect transfers, the shares sold are not those of a
Chinese company, but an offshore holding company. Technically, the gains from the sale of such shares are not sourced
in China. Economically, however, the value of the shares of may be derived solely or principally from the underlying
shares of the Chinese company. The Chinese tax base is, therefore, eroded in the sense that the economic gain accrued
in China is realized by a non-resident investor without paying taxes in China on the gain.
The SAT has relied on the domestic GAAR to attribute capital gains to a Chinese source in the Offshore Indirect Transfer
Circular (2009)[45] and Offshore Indirect Transfer Circular (2015).[46] The latter introduces the new concept of “taxable
Chinese property” to convey the scope of Chinese source-based taxation on capital gains.[47] Taxable Chinese property
refers to: (1) assets of an establishment or site through which business is carried on in China; (2) immovable property in
China; and (3) equity investments in resident enterprises.[48] The SAT circular has the effect of clarifying and modifying the
legislative source rules in article 7 of the EIT Regulations.
3.2.3. Abusive transactions
Offshore indirect transfers may take place where the original investor in China wants to dispose of its investment in
China, there is a cross-border merger and/or acquisition, and an intra-group restructuring. In this regard, the SAT circulars
provide guidance on abusive transfers and safe harbours.
The targeted transactions are indirect transfers that lack a reasonable business purpose and economic substance and
result in the avoidance of Chinese tax. Specifically, the relevant transactions are where: (1) the transferor is a non-
resident enterprise, i.e. the transferee can be a resident or non-resident of China; (2) the company whose shares are
transferred, i.e. the “intermediary”, holds “taxable Chinese properties”; (3) the effective transaction is the same as, or
similar to, a direct transfer of the taxable Chinese property; and (4) the transaction has no reasonable business purpose.
Whether a transaction has a reasonable business purpose is assessed by considering all related arrangements and
conducting a comprehensive analysis of the circumstances, including the following: (1) whether the value of equity
43. OECD, Part 2 of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries p. 16 (OECD 2014, available at
www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/part-2-of-report-to-g20-dwg-on-the-impact-of-beps-in-low-income-countries.pdf [hereinafter: “Part 2 of a Report to
G20 Development Working Group”].
44. Arts. 3 and 19 EIT Law.
45. SAT, Notice on Strengthening the Administration of Enterprise income Tax on Income From Transfers of Equity Interests by Non-resident
Enterprises, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 698 (10 Dec. 2009), retroactively effective from 1 January 2008.
46. Offshore Indirect Transfers Circular (2015), supra n. 25.
47. Id.
48. Id., at art.1.
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interests in the intermediary is principally derived, directly or indirectly, from taxable Chinese properties; (2) whether the
assets of the intermediary mainly consist, directly or indirectly, of investments in China, or whether the income of the
intermediary mainly consists, directly or indirectly, of income sourced from China; (3) what are the functions performed
and risks assumed by the intermediary and its subsidiaries that hold, directly or indirectly, taxable Chinese properties;
(4) how long have the shareholders, business model and relevant organizational structure of the intermediary existed;
(5) what is the foreign income tax on the gains from the indirect transfers of taxable Chinese properties; (6) whether
the transferor’s indirect investment in, and indirect transfers of, taxable Chinese properties is an alternative of a direct
investment or direct transfers of taxable Chinese properties; (7) whether a tax treaty applies to the indirect transfers of
taxable Chinese properties; and (8) other related factors.
A transaction is deemed to lack a reasonable business purpose in the following circumstances:
– more than 75% of the value of the equity in the intermediary is derived, directly or indirectly, from taxable Chinese
properties;
– at any time in the year immediately before the indirect transfer of a taxable Chinese property takes place, more
than 90% of the total investment, excluding cash, comprises, directly or indirectly, investments in China, or in the
year before the indirect transfer of a taxable Chinese property takes place, more than 90% of the income of the
intermediary is derived, directly or indirect, from Chinese sources;
– the functions performed and risks assumed by the intermediary and any of its subsidiaries that, directly or indirectly,
hold taxable Chinese properties are limited and are insufficient to provide their economic substance, despite the fact
that they are registered in their resident jurisdiction and meet the required legal form; and
– the foreign tax payable on the gain from the indirect transfer of taxable Chinese properties is less than the Chinese
tax otherwise payable on the gains from a direct transfer of such properties.
In practice, three types of factors are important in determining if there is sufficient economic substance in the intermediary
or transaction. The first is whether the intermediary is capable of performing functions and assuming risks on the basis of
analysing the intermediary’s personnel, assets and revenue relative to those of its related parties. If the intermediary has
USD 100 of paid-up capital, no personnel and no other assets, while holding valuable shares of Chinese companies, the
intermediary is considered to have no economic substance. The second is the time of the existence of the intermediary.
If the intermediary has existed for a brief period of time before its shares are transferred, this can be considered to
be evidence of the lack of economic substance. The third factor is whether or not the impugned indirect transfer is an
alternative to a direct transfer of taxable Chinese properties. Market conditions, regulatory approval of the transactions, as
well as the objectives and framework of the transactions are also relevant factors in determining if an indirect transfer is
an alternative to a direct transfer.[49]
Given that the offshore indirect transfer rules are anti-avoidance provisions, if the impugned indirect transfer does not
result in a reduction or avoidance of Chinese tax, it is not abusive. The SAT lists the following as relevant to determining
whether avoiding Chinese tax is a main purpose:
– Whether the tax payable in a foreign jurisdiction is less than the Chinese tax otherwise payable. If so, the indirect
transfer is presumed to be undertaken to avoid Chinese tax.
– Whether the gains, if realized through a direct transfer, would have been protected from Chinese taxation by a tax
treaty. If the gains were not to be taxed in China, the avoidance of Chinese tax is presumably not a purpose of the
indirect transfer.
– Whether the shares of the intermediary are publicly traded. Buying and selling publicly traded shares in companies
that hold taxable Chinese properties are presumed to have a business purpose and not to avoid Chinese tax.
– Whether the indirect transfers are part of an intra-group reorganization that does not result in any change in the
economic ownership or divestment of the non-resident investors. Eighty percent equity ownership is required to
qualify for an intra-group reorganization or 100% for companies holding immovable properties in China.
49. SAT, Concerning the interpretation of “Announcement of the State Administration of Taxation on Several Issues Relating to Corporate Income Tax
on Gains from Indirect Transfer of Assets by Non-resident Enterprises (3 Feb. 2015).
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– Whether a non-resident investor’s equity interests in Chinese taxable properties remain unchanged after the
impugned transfer.
3.2.4. Effective look-through rules
The SAT adopted three tests for tracing the value of gains from offshore indirect transfers to a Chinese source. These
are: (1) the share value test; (2) the asset test; and (3) the revenue test. They function as look-through rules.
Under the share value test, if more than 75% of the value of the shares of the intermediary is derived from taxable
Chinese properties, any indirect transfer of the shares is deemed to lack a reasonable commercial purpose, thereby
resulting in the gains being taxed in China. This has the same effect as defining “taxable Chinese property” to include
shares of a non-resident company that holds shares of Chinese companies. If a lesser percentage of the value of the
shares transferred is derived from taxable Chinese properties, an indirect transfer of the shares may still be deemed to
have no reasonable commercial purpose after a consideration of all relevant factors.
Under the asset test, the source of gains from an indirect transfer is deemed to be in China if more than 90% of the
intermediary’s assets are investments in China, i.e. not limited to equity investments, or if more than 90% of the
intermediary’s revenues are derived from Chinese sources. The 90% threshold may be tested at any time in the year
preceding the transfer. In effect, for the indirect transfer of shares of an intermediary that holds licences in respect of
Chinese companies or debt investments in Chinese companies, any gain from the transfer is taxable in China. That is,
the source of the gain accrued to the shares of the holding company is deemed to be the same as royalties or interest
income earned by the company. There is, therefore, symmetry between the source rule for royalties and interest paid by
Chinese companies, and the source rule for the capital gains arising from the shares of the holding company that holds
the licences or debts.
3.2.5. Safe harbours
Safe harbours are provided where non-Chinese tax is avoided as a result of an offshore indirect transfer. Conditions for
safe harbours include:
– For “intra-group” reorganizations, the shareholding relationship of the transferor and transferee meets any of the
following tests: (1) the transferor holds, directly or indirectly, more than 80% of the equity of the transferee; (2) the
transferee holds, directly or indirectly, more than 80% of the equity of the non-resident transferor; or (3) the same
party holds, directly or indirectly, more than 80% of the equity of the non-resident transferor and transferee.[50]
– For non-Chinese tax leakage scenarios, the Chinese tax payable on any subsequent indirect transfer undertaken
after the indirect transfer in issue is not less than the Chinese tax payable on the same or a similar indirect transfer if
it were undertaken before the indirect transfer in issue.
– For share-for-share exchanges, the transferee pays all consideration in equities, excluding equities in listed
enterprises, of the transferee itself or its controlled enterprises.
The anti-avoidance rules also do not apply where: (1) the shares transferred indirectly are publicly listed shares acquired
by the transferor from the open market; and (2) the gains would be exempt from Chinese tax under a tax treaty had the
gains been realized from a direct transfer.
3.3. Improper use of tax treaties
3.3.1. Overview
The SAT has dealt with the issue of treaty abuse in several ways. These include: (1) interpreting the meaning of the
beneficial ownership test according to a purposive interpretation of tax treaties; (2) including an anti-abuse provision in a
tax treaty, i.e. a principal purpose rule or a limitations on benefits (LOB) rule; and (3) relying on the domestic GAAR.
50. For the purpose of the safe harbour, the shareholding percentage must be 100% if more than 50% of the value of the intermediary’s equity
is derived, directly or indirectly, from immovable property situated in China. The indirect shareholding percentage should be calculated by
multiplying the shareholding percentages of each enterprise in the share chain (see art. 6 Offshore Indirect Transfers Circular (2015), supra n.
25).
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3.3.2. Beneficial ownership
The SAT’s interpretation of beneficial ownership is published in the following circulars: (1) the BO Circular 601 (2009);[51]
(2) the BO Announcement 30 (2012);[52] (3) the BO Hong Kong Letter (2013);[53] and (4) the BO Announcement 24
(2014).[54] The first two documents provide general guidelines, the third relaxes the standard for residents in Hong Kong
and the fourth deals with entrusted investments or collective investment entities. A later document generally supplements,
but does not replace, an earlier document.
A “beneficial owner” is a person who has the right of ownership and disposal over the dividend, interest and royalty
income received from China or the associated properties and rights.[55] Generally, a beneficial owner is supposed to
conduct substantive business operations. Agents and conduit entities, therefore, do not qualify as beneficial owners.
“Conduit entities” are defined as companies that are established in the residence jurisdiction for the purpose of evading
or reducing tax, or transferring profits. These entities do not perform manufacturing, distribution or management functions
and possess barely enough substance to meet the minimum legal requirements imposed by the residence state. In
addition to a technical legal analysis, the circular emphasizes the determination of substance on the basis of the facts of
the situation.
Adverse factors are listed in BO Circular 601 as relevant to determining if a recipient of China-source income is a
beneficial owner. These are:[56]
– the recipient is under an obligation to distribute all or the most of the China-source income to a resident of a third
jurisdiction within a specified period;
– other than holding the properties or rights that generate the income received, the recipient conducts little or no
business activities;
– if the recipient is a corporation or another business entity, the assets, the size of operations and the human
resources of the recipient are disproportionately small relative to the income received from China;
– the recipient does not, or almost does not, have rights to control or dispose of the income or the properties or rights
giving rise to the income, and bears little or no risks;
– the recipient is exempt from, or is not subject to, tax in the residence state with regard to the income received from
China, or the recipient pays tax in the residence state but at a very low effective tax rate; and
– for interest income from a loan agreement, the recipient has a loan or deposit agreement with another party with
terms resembling those in the primary loan agreement.
None of the above factors is decisive. According to the circular, a determination must be based on a comprehensive
analysis of all relevant factors and cannot be based solely on the existence of a specific negative factor or the absence of
the tax avoidance purpose:[57]
– Where the recipient is an agent or nominee of another party, i.e. the principal, factors associated with the principal
should be considered in making the beneficial ownership assessment.
51. SAT, Circular on how to understand and recognize the “Beneficial Owner” in tax treaties, Guoshuihan (2009) No. 601 (27 Oct. 2009) [hereinafter:
“BO Circular 601”]. The SAT had previously released the following two circulars dealing with access to treaty benefits: (1) Guoshuihan (2009)
No. 81 (20 Feb. 2009), setting out guidance relating to the implementation of dividend clauses in tax treaties; and (2) Guoshuifa (2009) No. 124,
providing guidance and clarifying procedures and documentation requirements for non-residents seeking to take advantage of treaty benefits on
their Chinese-source income.
52. SAT, Announcement on Determining Beneficial Ownership in the context of Qualifying for PRC Treaty Benefits, Gonggao (2012) No. 30 (29 June
2012) [hereinafter: “BO Announcement 30”].
53. SAT, Opinion Letter on the determination of beneficial ownership cases under the dividend article of the PRC-HK double tax arrangement,
Shuizonghan [2013] No. 165 (Circular 165) (12 Apr. 2013) [hereinafter: “BO Hong Kong Letter”].
54. SAT, Announcement on the Definition of “Beneficial Owner” under Entrusted Investments, Gonggao 2014 No. 24 (21 Apr. 2014) [hereinafter: “BO
Announcement 24”].
55. Art. 1 BO Circular 601, supra n. 51.
56. Id., at art. 2.
57. Art. 1 BO Announcement 30, supra n. 52.
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– A safe harbour is where an overseas listed company or its same-country subsidiaries receive dividends from China.
If the recipient company is a resident in a treaty state and listed in that jurisdiction, it is automatically regarded as a
beneficial owner.
The substantive business activities and assets test disqualifies most, if not all, holding companies as beneficial owners.
This has significant implications for investors who use Hong Kong as a base for investments in China. In order to address
the uncertainties and anxieties, the BO Hong Kong Circular extends a preferential approach to assessing beneficial
ownership to treaty relief claims by Hong Kong companies through the following clarifications:
– Under the China-Hong Kong Income Tax Arrangement (2006),[58] the beneficial owner status of the recipient should
not be adversely affected if the recipient does not make any distributions to a non-HK resident.
– For the purpose of adverse factor 2, “investment activities” are considered to be “business activities” and treaty relief
cannot be denied solely on the basis that the recipient only holds one investment. That is, a holding company should
not be denied any treaty benefits simply because it has only one investment. Other factors should also be taken into
account.
– For the purposes of adverse factor 3, the SAT is not to draw negative inference from the fact that the recipient is
thinly capitalized. No negative inference is to be drawn if the capitalization level is commercially justifiable and the
interest payments on the recipient’s debt do not result in a failure of the income retention test in adverse factor 1.
If the registered capital of the recipient is very low, whether or not its income is commensurate with its assets, this
should be assessed in light of the sources of its capital investment risk. In assessing whether or not the staffing is
commensurate with the income earned, the responsibilities and nature of work of the staff should be considered,
and not solely the number of staff and the size of staff costs of the recipient.
– For purpose of adverse factor 4, in examining whether or not the recipient has legal capacity and right of control and
disposal over the income or investments and bears risks, the following three specific issues must be analysed: (1)
do the articles of association and other legal documents of the recipient grant such rights of control and disposal; (2)
has the recipient exercised such rights before; and (3) is the exercise of such rights voluntary, as evidenced by the
resolutions of the general meetings or board meetings, etc? The mere fact that the applicant’s shares are controlled
by a higher-level corporation should not negate the existence of rights of control or disposal of the applicant.
– For the purpose of adverse factor 5, the fact that the offshore dividend income of a Hong Kong resident falls outside
the scope of the Hong Kong profits tax under the territorial tax system should have no negative implications in
determining the beneficial ownership of the income. Tax filing should also be taken into account.
Under BO Announcement 24, an investor in a collective investment scheme[59] can be treated as a beneficial owner
where: (1) the overseas professional institution that manages the investment must maintain separate accounts for their
own funding and the entrustment funding during the entrustment period, and collect service fees or commissions under
the entrustment agreement; and (2) the investor obtains investment income and bears the relevant investment risks.
Overall, the SAT has interpreted the beneficial ownership test on the basis of the substance-over-form principle, which
may elevate the test to a broader anti-treaty abuse rule.
3.3.3. Principal purpose test
Some Chinese tax treaties contain a principal purpose provision.[60] Some recently amended tax treaties also contain a
similar principal purpose test in the dividends, interest and royalties articles.[61]
58. H.K.-P.R.C. Income Tax Arrangement (unofficial translation) (21 Aug. 2006) (as amended through 2010), Treaties IBFD.
59. BO Announcement 24, supra n. 54 defines “entrusted investment” as equity or debt investments made by a non-resident with its own capital
through an overseas professional institution and “overseas professional institution” as a financial institution approved by the home jurisdiction to
conduct business in securities brokerage, asset management, capital and securities trust, etc.
60. For instance, Austl.-P.R.C. Income Tax Treaty art. 4(5) (17 Nov. 1988), Treaties IBFD.
61. For instance, P.R.C.-Sing. Income (11 July 2007) (as amended through 2010), Fin-P.R.C. Income (25 May 2010), Malta-P.R.C. Income (23 Oct.
2010), Den.-P.R.C. Income (16 June 2012), Neth.-P.R.C. Income (31 May 2013), P.R.C-Swit. Income and Capital (25 Sept. 2013), Fr.-P.R.C.
Income (unofficial translation) (26 Nov. 2013) and Ger.-P.R.C. Income and Capital (28 Mar. 2014) Tax Treaties, Treaties IBFD. See also P.R.C.-
U.K. Income Tax Treaty art. 10(7) (27 June 2011) (as amended through 2013), Treaties IBFD
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3.3.4. LOB
An LOB article can be found in the China-United States (1986)[62] and the China-Mexico (2005) Income Tax Treaties.[63]
The LOB clause in these tax treaties is substantially similar. According to the China-Mexico Income Tax Treaty (2005),
a resident of Mexico does not qualify for treaty relief in China, unless it is a publicly traded company or a subsidiary of
resident individual or publicly traded company, or it is not a “conduit”.
Under the LOB provision of the US Treaty, a corporation which is a resident of a contracting state is denied treaty benefits
unless: (1) its shares are publicly traded; or (2) more than 50% of the shares of each class of the company’s shares
are owned, directly or indirectly, by any combination of one or more of: (i) individuals who are residents of one of the
Contracting States and (ii) a publicly traded company. For relief under the dividends, interest and royalties provisions, a
recipient of such income is entitled to treaty benefits if not more than 50% of the gross income of such person is used
to make relevant payments to persons who are not entitled to treaty benefits. The LOB provision also states that these
limitations should not apply:
if the establishment, acquisition and maintenance of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as a
principal purpose the purpose of obtaining benefits under the Agreement.
3.3.5. Domestic GAAR
China’s tax treaties concluded before 2006 do not contain any provision that allows the use of a domestic GAAR to
counter treaty abuse. The domestic GAAR was enacted in 2007 and became effective on 1 January 2008.[64] Since 2007,
the domestic GAAR has been incorporated into an increasing number of tax treaties. For instance, article 23 of the China-
Netherlands Income Tax Treaty (2013) states that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of each Contracting State to apply its domestic laws and
measures concerning the prevention of tax evasion and avoidance, whether or not described as such, insofar as
they do not give rise to taxation contrary to this Agreement.
In practice, it appears to be clear that an explicit GAAR article in a tax treaty is included for the purposes of greater
certainty. The absence of such a provision in a tax treaty does not mean that the GAAR is not relied on by the SAT.
Applying domestic GAAR to deny treaty benefits may result in double taxation of the income if the treaty partner state
does not agree with China’s approach. For instance, where a resident of the United States sells shares of a US company
that owns nothing but shares of a Chinese corporation, China may invoke its GAAR and tax the capital gains as Chinese-
source income. The United States may not grant foreign tax credit for the Chinese taxes, as the gains are not taxable in
China under the tax treaty.[65] This kind of dispute is likely more common if the treaty partner is a common law country that
adheres more to the form-over-substance doctrine and emphasizes textual interpretation of treaty provisions.
3.4. Improper use of corporate forms
3.4.1. Empty shells
A corporation is a legal fiction. The law recognizes the separate identity of a corporation and the limited liability of its
owners for the purpose of promoting production and business activities.[66] A corporation is, by nature, a business entity.
Avoiding taxes is not a business activity per se. When a corporation is created for the main purpose of avoiding taxes and
has no capacity to conduct any substantive activities, it is considered to be an abuse of the corporate form. Such holding
62. Protocol 2, P.R.C.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty (30 Apr. 1984) (as amended through 1986), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: “LOB Provision of US Treaty”].
63. Mex.-P.R.C. Income Tax Treaty (12 Sept. 2005), Treaties IBFD.
64. Art. 47 EIT Law and art. 120 EIT Regulations. For more on this topic, see J. Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the
Chinese and Canadian GAAR, 11 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2, p. 75 (2009) and W. Xiong & C. Evans, Towards an Improved Design of the
Chinese General Anti-Avoidance Rule: A Comparative Analysis, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2014), Journals IBFD.
65. Q. Zhou, The Relationship between China’s Tax Treaties and Indirect Transfer Antiavoidance Rules, Tax Notes Intl. p. 543 (12 May 2014) and C.
Xing, C. Ho & R. Di, New Landscape of Chinese Tax Treaties, in China: Looking Ahead 2nd ed. Intl. Tax Rev. p. 21 (2013).
66. See, for example, F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985).
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companies are regarded to be shell companies if they do not carry on any production, distribution, sales, management
and other substantive activities.
Empty shells are used by both foreign-based and China-based MNEs, and wealthy individuals.[67] Chinese resident
taxpayers use holding companies in tax havens, typically the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, for purposes
of raising capital overseas to invest in China or move ownership offshore. It is suspected that offshore entities are also
used by corrupt officials in China to hide or launder money.[68] MNEs may use holding companies to hold intangible
property, equity interest or debts in subsidiaries, including those in China.
3.4.2. Anti-abuse measures
Using empty shells to avoid Chinese taxes is counter to the substance-over-form principle that underlies the Chinese
anti-avoidance measures. The SAT has relied on the GAAR and transfer pricing rules to deny tax benefits arising from
such use. For instance, payments made by Chinese enterprises to a related shell company are not deductible for EIT
purposes if the shell company undertakes no functions, bears no risks or has no substantial operations or activities.[69] If
the shell company is located in a treaty state, dividend, interest or royalty payments may be denied treaty benefits on the
ground that the shell company is not a beneficial owner (see section 3.3.2.). Indirect transfers of equity interest in Chinese
companies through the sale of shares in the shell company may be subject to the GAAR (see section 3.2.3.).
3.5. Profit shifting through transfer pricing
3.5.1. Overview
Transfer pricing issues occupy a prominent place in the BEPS initiative. Action 8, i.e. Intangibles, Action 9, i.e. Risks/
capital, Action 10, i.e. Other high-risk transactions, and Action 13, i.e. Transfer pricing documentation, are directly
related to transfer pricing. In addition, Action 1, i.e. Digital economy, and Action 4, i.e. Interest deductions/other financial
payments, involve some transfer pricing issues.
Transfer pricing is a major form of BEPS in China.[70] According to the SAT, intra-group payments of service fees and
royalties are of particular significance. Service fees account for a major share of outbound payments. The range of
services is very broad and the potential leakage from the Chinese tax base is significant. Royalties and intangibles have
also been a major issue. The Outbound Payments Notice (2015)[71] standardizes and strengthens the administration of
transfer pricing in respect of outbound payments of service fees and royalties. In its press release, the SAT stated this
notice is another BEPS measure, following the introduction of the GAAR and the Offshore Indirect Transfers Measures.[72]
Instead of attempting to determine the arm’s length price for the intra-group service transactions, the Outbound Payments
Notice (2015) denies the existence of transactions if they provide no economic benefit to the Chinese affiliate. It builds on
the SAT previous views on the arm’s length principle and practices in applying the transfer pricing methods.[73]
3.5.2. China’s approach to transfer pricing
Chinese law includes the arm’s length principle[74] and the SAT has incorporated the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
(the “OECD Guidelines”)[75] into its administrative practices.[76] China’s position on the challenges in applying the arm’s
67. Jiangsu STB Paper, supra n. 15.
68. Y. Sun, Escalating Anti-Tax Evasion Tactics in Mainland China , available at www.ifengweekly.com/detil.php?id=1589 (in Chinese).
69. Art. 3 Outbound Payments Notice (2015), supra n. 27.
70. UN Response re BEPS, supra n. 9.
71. Outbound Payments Notice (2015), supra n. 27.
72. SAT, Attacking Cross-Border Tax Avoidance and Plugging Taxation Loopholes: SAT Strengthens the Administration of Transfer Pricing related to
Outbound Payments of Expenses (20 Mar. 2015), available at www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c1519231/content.html (in Chinese).
73. Inter alia, SAT: (1) Notice [2014] No. 146, supra n. 27; (2) Public Announcement about Issues Related to Monitoring and Administration of
Special Tax Adjustments, Gonggao [2014] No. 54; (3) Panel Review Rules for Significant Special Tax Adjustment Cases (Trial), Guoshuifa
[2012] No. 16; (4) Internal Work Rules of Special Tax Adjustments (Trial), Guoshuifa [2012] No. 13; (5) Notice on Conducting Examinations of
Contemporaneous Documentation, Guoshuihan [2010] No. 323; (6) Circular on Strengthening Supervision and Investigation of Cross-Border
Related-Party Transactions, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 363; (7) Notice Regarding the Status of Anti-tax Avoidance Efforts in 2009, Guoshuihan
[2010] No. 84; and (8) EIT Treatment Related to Payment for Provision of Services between Parent Company and Its Subsidiary Company,
Guoshui Fa [2008] No. 86; and (9) Ministry of Finance & SAT, Notice on the Tax Deductibility of Interest Expense Paid to Related Parties, Caishui
[2008] No. 121.
74. Art. 41 EIT Law.
75. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD 1995 & 2010), International Organizations’
Documentation IBFD, also available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/12/45763692.pdf [hereinafter: “OECD Guidelines (1995 & 2010)”].
76. Special Tax Adjustment Measures (2009), supra n. 28.
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length principle and the transfer pricing methodologies is officially stated in the UN TP Manual. China has identified some
major challenges in transfer pricing and expressed approaches that deviate from the OECD Guidelines. Some of these
are noted subsequently in this section.
A major challenge in transfer pricing is a lack of reliable, public information on comparables, i.e.:
comparable sets are often dominated by companies in developed countries, simply because there are usually a
much larger number of public companies in these countries.[77]
The SAT must make comparability adjustments to bridge the material differences between the Chinese market and
foreign markets to account for differences in China and foreign countries when applying profit-based methods, i.e.
geographical markets comparability adjustments. China regards location specific advantages (LSA), such as location
savings[78] and market premium,[79] as relevant factors, as they represent advantages for production arising from assets,
resource endowments, and government industry policies and incentives that exist in specific localities.
Another major challenge in applying the transfer pricing rules is related to intangibles. MNEs often provide intangibles
to their Chinese affiliates in return for royalties and other payments. Over time, the Chinese affiliates contribute to the
improvement of the original intangibles or create additional value of global brand name through effective marketing in the
Chinese markets. Even if accepting the original royalties were reasonable, China questions:
whether the Chinese affiliate should continue to pay a royalty to the parent company for the manufacturing process,
or whether the Chinese affiliates should be entitled to a return on the intangibles that they have developed and
shared with the group companies.[80]
China prefers profit-based method to address these challenges. It has also expressed different approaches to the transfer
pricing issue:
– A holistic view of functions and risks may have to be adopted.[81] A risk-based approach may have insufficient regard
for the fact that there are sizeable assets located in China.
– A contribution-based approach may be more suitable than a transactional or profits-based approach. This is
particularly the case where the majority of the work force and tangible assets of foreign-based MNEs are in
China. An example is the electronic manufacturing services (EMS) sector, where the entire, or nearly the entire,
manufacturing and assembly activities of an MNE have been outsourced to a Chinese affiliate. Under a contribution
based approach, the remuneration to each party involved would be commensurate with its role and contribution to
the value chain in the MNE, i.e. “[i]n this case, the assets and the people should largely dictate where the group’s
profits should stay”.[82] The technical legal ownership of intangibles or contractually assigned assumption of risks is
not among important, or even relevant, factors.
– China is open to use alternative methods. For instance, global formulary approach “should be a realistic and
appropriate method”.[83] In allocating profit to a Chinese affiliate of an MNE, the SAT may “determine the property
return for the headquarters, with the Chinese manufacturer earning the residual profits”[84] or “to evaluate the
77. UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at para. 10.3.2.2.
78. Id., where the concept is explained as follows: “Location savings are the net cost savings derived by a multinational company when it sets up its
operations in a low-cost jurisdiction. Net cost savings are commonly realized through lower expenditure on items such as raw materials, labour,
rent, transportation and infrastructure even though additional expenses (so-called dis-savings) may be incurred due to the relocation, such as
increased training costs in return for hiring less skilled labour”.
79. Id., where it is stated that: “Market premium relates to the additional profit derived by a multinational company by operating in a jurisdiction with
unique qualities impacting on the sale and demand of a service or product”.
80. Id., at para. 380.
81. Id., at para. 10.3.5.2.
82. Id., at para. 10.3.6.3.
83. Id.
84. Id., at para. 10.3.6.4.
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Chinese manufacturer on the return on its assets or capital employed, using the group’s results as a comparable for
the Chinese manufacturer”.[85]
China’s emphasis on contribution analysis and value creation is consistent with the BEPS initiative as the Action Plan is
intended to ensure that taxation is aligned with substance and transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation.[86]
Notable issues from the Chinese position on transfer pricing include LSAs, value creation to intangibles by local
subsidiaries, applying an economic benefit test in denying deduction for intra-group services and holistic examinations of
the MNE activities as opposed to those limited to Chinese affiliates.
3.5.3. LSAs
The term “location specific advantages” was used by China probably for the first time in the context of transfer pricing in
the UN TP Manual. This term is not found in the 1995[87] or the 2010 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.[88]
The concept “local specific advantages” is defined in the UN TP Manual as “advantages for production arising from
assets, resource endowments, government industry policies and incentives, etc., which exist in specific localities”.[89]
It includes location savings and market premium. Location savings capture the supply-side advantages in running
operations in low-cost jurisdictions and market premium refers to demand-side advantages that correspond to other
advantages that the market structure offers.[90]
Location savings are net cost savings, i.e. the savings realized by MNEs relocating from a high-cost jurisdiction to a low-
cost jurisdiction are offset by dis-savings or disadvantages associated with the cost of training, lower competitiveness and
a higher cost of business. Location savings are among the main reasons why MNEs invest in developing countries.[91]
According to data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics,[92] the average hourly compensation cost in manufacturing in
2009 was estimated at USD 1.74 in China, higher than that of USD 1.70 in the Philippines and USD 1.24 in India,[93] but
still lower than that of USD 15.06 in Korea (Rep.) and USD 30.03 in Japan. The electronics manufacturers also enjoy
a “well-developed network of suppliers”,[94] as another cost saving factor that allows easier access to parts and other
resources.
Market premium refers to:
the additional profit derived by a multinational company by operating in a jurisdiction with unique qualities impacting
on the sale and demand of a service or product.[95]
Such unique qualities or advantages include the existence of legal, regulatory or administrative restrictions, which limit
the number of competitors and induce an artificial scarcity in the relevant market, consumer preference for foreign brands
and inelastic demand for certain luxury products. In essence, the market premium concept seeks to capture the additional
profit realized by an MNE through higher sales or sales at higher prices.
85. Id.
86. OECD, Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 10: Discussion Draft on the Use of Profit Splits in the Context of Global Value Chains para. 34
(OECD 2015) [hereinafter: “Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 10”].
87. OECD Guidelines (1995 & 2010), supra n. 75. The closest concept in the OECD Guidelines (1995), supra n. 75, at para. 1.30 would be
“economic circumstances” as factors in comparability adjustments, i.e.: “[e]conomic circumstances that may be relevant to determining market
comparability include the geographic location; the size of the markets; the extent of competition in the markets and the relative competitive
positions of the buyers and sellers; the availability (risk thereof) of substitute goods and services; the levels of supply and demand in the market
as a whole and in particular regions, if relevant; consumer purchasing power; the nature and extent of government regulation of the market; costs
of production, including the costs of land, labour, and capital; transport costs; the level of the market (e.g. retail or wholesale); the date and time
of transactions; and so forth.” (Emphasis added).
88. OECD Guidelines (2010, supra n. 75, at para. 1.57, which elaborates further on the factor of geographic markets which can affect comparability
as follows: “The identification of the relevant market is a factual question. For a number of industries, large regional markets encompassing more
than one country may prove to be reasonably homogeneous, while for others, differences among domestic markets (or even within domestic
markets) are very significant”.
89. UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at para. 10.3.3.1.
90. S. Gonnet, P. Fris & T. Coriano, Location Specific Advantages – Principles, Transfer Pricing Intl. J., pp. 6-7 (Special Issue: November 2011).
91. See, for example, UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at para. 10.3.3.1.
92. See www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/05/art1full.pdf; www.bls.gov/fls/china_method.pdf; and www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ichcc_12212011.pdf.
93. Gonnet, Fris & Coriano, supra n. 90, at p. 23.
94. UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at para. 10.3.3.1.
95. Id., at para. 10.3.3.3.
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Market premium is an important issue for China, as the country is becoming the “market of the world”. The Chinese
market also has certain distinct features in terms of its size and growth, as well as consumer preferences.[96] One of the
idiosyncratic features is the strong consumer preference for foreign brands:
Chinese consumers’ general preference for foreign brands and imported products – this general preference, as
opposed to loyalty to a specific brand, creates opportunities for MNEs to charge higher prices and earn additional
profits on automotive products sold in China.[97]
Recognizing the value of LSAs in transfer pricing assessment is new. The SAT has adopted a four-step approach: (1)
identifying if an LSA exists; (2) determining if the LSA generates additional profit; (3) quantifying and measuring the
additional profits arising from the LSA; and (4) determining the transfer pricing method to allocate the profits arising from
the LSA.[98]
In the UN TP Manual, China states that industry analysis and quantitative analysis are critical in applying this approach.
Chinese LSAs are expected to result in profit allocations to Chinese affiliates because many LSAs have led to
extraordinarily high profits that are rightly earned by Chinese taxpayers.[99]
In practice, the SAT has attempted to use profit split methods where there are significant marketing intangibles or LSAs.
Alternatively, it has used LSAs in performing comparability adjustments where the Transactional Net Margin Method
(TNMM) is used:
For example, if the median operating expense to sales ratio for the comparable set is only 7 per cent, and the same
ratio for the taxpayer is 40 per cent. To the extent that there are location savings, cost base is adjusted first. The
Chinese tax administration would then calculate the additional return required for the extra efforts made by the
Chinese taxpayer to derive the total return for the Chinese taxpayer.[100]
3.5.4. Intra-group royalties and value creation
Payments of royalties by a Chinese affiliate of an MNE are viewed as suspicious with regard to BEPS where (1) the
recipient is an entity in tax haven jurisdictions; or (2) the recipient performs no functions or assumes simple functions
when a Chinese affiliate has made “special contributions” to the value of the proprietary right or when the proprietary right
has decreased in value. In July 2014, local tax authorities were instructed to monitor intra-group payments of royalties
with a view of strengthening the audit and enforcement of transfer pricing rules.[101]
In assessing whether the royalties are deductible for a Chinese payer, a contribution-based value creation analysis must
be undertaken. The Outbound Payments Notice (2015) states that royalties paid to a non-resident related party that
merely has legal ownership of the intangible property but does not contribute to value creation in respect of the property,
and are not in compliance with the arm’s length principle, are not deductible in computing taxable income.[102]
In other cases, the royalties should reflect the contributions by the relevant parties and the benefits to be derived. Article 5
of the Outbound Payments Notice (2015) states that:
96. Gonnet, Fris & Coriano, supra n. 90, at pp. 25-27.
97. UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at para. 10.3.3.6.
98. Id., at para. 10.3.3.4.
99. Id. The LSAs include the “market-for-technology” industry policy of the Chinese government, Chinese consumers’ general preference for foreign
brands and imported products, inelastic demand for automotive vehicles in China, capacity constraints on the supply of domestically assembled
vehicles and duty savings from the lower duty rates on automotive parts, and a large supply of high quality, low costs parts manufactured by
suppliers in China.
100. Id., at para. 10.3.5.11.
101. Notice [2014] No.146, supra n. 27.
102. Article 6 of the Outbound Payments Notice (2015), supra n. 27 refers to royalty payments to overseas related parties in compensation for
incidental benefits arising from financial or listing activities, where a holding or financing company is established offshore for the main purpose of
financing or listing.
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the extent of contributions by each related party to the value-creation of such intangible property should be
considered in order to determine each party’s entitlement to the economic benefit arising from the value creation.
It provides the following guidance on how to determine the contributions to value creation in respect of intangibles and the
respective economic benefits arising from the contribution:
Enterprises which are required to make royalty payments to overseas related parties about technology, brand
and other intangible assets should determine the contributions made by each party to the value creation of the
intangible assets in order to confirm the economic benefits that each party is entitled on the basis of analysing each
party’s functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed in the development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection, application and promotion of the intangible assets. Furthermore, the enterprises should comply with
the arm’s length principle in determining whether it is necessary to make royalty payments to the overseas related
parties and how much payment should be made.
Royalty payments to an overseas related party which only owns the legal rights of the intangible asset but having
no contribution to its value creation are not in compliance with the arm’s length principle [and] are not deductible for
tax purposes. For example, where a Chinese real estate enterprise utilizes the brand or trademark of an overseas
related party in its real estate development, if the trademark or brand is gradually being recognized through the
process of real estate development by the enterprise and the value of the trademark or brand is increased as the
result of the domestic enterprise’s promotion and maintenance, the royalties payment should be regarded as not in
compliance with the arm’s length principle, and are thus not deductible for EIT purposes.[103]
Erosion of the Chinese tax base through intra-group royalties is not limited to foreign-based MNEs. Some China-based
MNEs transfer intangibles developed in China to offshore holding companies and license the intangibles back to Chinese
operating companies in return for royalties.[104]
The SAT approach to royalties reflects its emphasis on economic substance and contributions to value creation as
opposed to a mere legal entitlement. One of the practical difficulties for the SAT is how to distinguish between royalties
and technical service fees.[105]
3.5.5. Intra-group services
Intra-group services are not addressed in detail in the “China Country Practice” section of the UN TP Manual. In April
2014, in response to the UN’s request for comments on intra-group service and management fees, the SAT submitted
an official response to express its views and provide recommendations to be included in the next update of the UN TP
Manual. [106] The SAT reaffirmed its view that service fees paid between related parties must be in compliance with the
arm’s length principle. In this regard, the SAT agrees with the OECD Guidelines[107] that:
whether intra-group services comply with the arm’s length principle should mainly be analyzed from the following
two aspects: firstly, to determine whether intra-group services have been rendered; and secondly, to determine an
arm’s length price that an independent third party would have been willing to pay for the services rendered under
the same circumstances.[108]
103. SAT, Commentary, Offshore Payments Notice, supra n. 27, available at www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810760/c1519250/content.html  (in
Chinese).
104. D. Li & Y. Yang, China Deals a Heavy Blow on International Tax Avoidance: “General Anti-Avoidance Rule Measures”, Nashuiren Bao (28 Jan.
2015), available at http://db.zgnsrb.com.cn/pdf/disishibaqi.pdf (in Chinese).
105. SAT, People’s Republic of China Views on Service Fees and Management Fees pp. 1-2, available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/ta-tp-CommentsPRC.pdf [hereinafter: “UN Response re Services]. In its Response to the UN, the SAT provides the following
example: “a proprietary technology licensing contract containing service terms may provide the rights to use the proprietary technology as well
as the provision of technical assistance services”. It recommends that the UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, provides additional guidance on how to
differentiate royalties from technical service fees.
106. Id.
107. OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 75, at ch. VII, Special Consideration for Intra-group Services.
108. UN Response re Services, supra n. 105.
© Copyright 2015  IBFD: No part of this information may be reproduced or distributed without permission of IBFD.
Disclaimer: IBFD will not be liable for any damages arising from the use of this information.
China also agrees with the OECD Guidelines that the benefit test applies in determining whether services have been
rendered.[109] In China’s view, an activity provides a “benefit” if it directly results in a reasonably identifiable increment of
economic or commercial value that enhances the recipient’s commercial position or that may be reasonably anticipated to
do so.
On the basis of the Response to the UN and Outbound Payments Notice (2015), The SAT’s interpretation of the benefit
test requires the consideration of the following:
– A two-sided perspective: when applying the benefit test, it should not only be considered from the service recipient’s
perspective. The analysis should also be performed from the perspective of both the service provider and the
service recipient. An example is services provided by a parent company that are associated with its own strategic
management, but not classified as “shareholder activities”. Although the subsidiary may benefit from such services,
the parent company benefits more. Consequently, the parent company should not charge service fees to the
subsidiary merely because the subsidiary may benefit from the services.
– Necessity: if the services are not necessarily needed by the Chinese subsidiary, there is most likely no economic
benefit to the subsidiary. For instance, various advisory and legal services provided by a parent company may
confer some benefit to a manufacturing subsidiary in China. However, these high-end services may not be needed
from the perspective of the subsidiary given its functions and a cost-benefit analysis. Similarly, if the intra-group
services are already purchased by the Chinese subsidiary from a third party or already performed by the Chinese
subsidiary, they are likely to have some benefit for the subsidiary.
– Double remuneration: in applying the best analysis, it is necessary to consider whether the provision of various
services from a parent or related company to the Chinese subsidiary have already been remunerated through
other transactions. For instance, when the parent company provides intangibles to the subsidiary and shares the
associated residual profit, i.e. the royalties from its subsidiary, the parent company should not separately charge
the subsidiary additional management fees regarding the management or control activities related to the use of the
intangible property.
– Incidental or passive benefit from the MNE group: negative inferences may be drawn in making the benefit analysis
if the services in issue benefit the Chinese subsidiary solely for being a member of an MNE and are not specifically
provided to a Chinese subsidiary.[110]
– Shareholder activities: the definition of shareholder services in the OECD Guidelines is too narrow by excluding
management or stewardship activities.[111] Consequently, the parent company can charge its subsidiary service
fees relating to managing and controlling the subsidiaries and the subsidiaries can deduct these expenses in
calculating their taxable incomes. That is: “[i]n fact, most of the subsidiaries in developing countries have their
own management teams, and they only need management decision approvals from the parent companies due to
authorisation requirements. In this situation, we believe that these types of management services are likely to be
duplicative activities or shareholder activities and, therefore, should not be charged”.[112]
– Management fees: article 49 of the EIT Regulations prohibits the deduction of management fees paid by a Chinese
company to other companies. Non-deductible management fees generally “relate to shareholder activities, which
are charged on the basis of an associated relationship between investors and investees, therefore not deductible in
calculating taxable income”.[113]
Intra-group services that fail the benefit test are deemed not to have been rendered to the Chinese affiliate and payments
for such services are inconsistent with the arm’s length principle, as independent enterprises would not make such
payments. The payments are not deductible for EIT purpose. There is, therefore, no need to establish an arm’s length
price for the transactions.
109. Id.
110. This is different from the OECD Guidelines (2010), supra n. 75, which state at para. 7.12: “Examples could be analysing the question whether to
reorganise the group, to acquire new members, or to terminate a division. These activities could constitute intragroup services to the particular
group members involved, for example those members who will make the acquisition or terminate one of their divisions, but they may also
produce economic benefits for other group members not involved in the object of the decision by increasing efficiencies, economies of scale, or
other synergies.”
111. UN Response re Services, supra n. 105, at paras. 4-5.
112. Id.
113. Id., at paras. 1-2.
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Where intra-group services satisfy the benefit test, the transfer pricing methodologies, especially comparable uncontrolled
price (CUP) and cost plus methods, would presumably apply to determine if any portion of a payment were not
deductible. The SAT’s position is broadly consistent with Public Discussion Draft on Action 10 with regard to the
determination of whether or not intra-group services have been provided.
In China’s experience with transfer pricing investigations relating to intra-group services, a major challenge is validating
the authenticity of the services provided and the reasonableness of the associated allocation mechanisms. The SAT
states in the Response to the UN:
In comparison with related party buy/sale transactions, intra-group services have a wider variety of arrangements
and are undertaken in many different forms. Therefore, the breadth of potential information regarding service
fees could be very large (from thousands to tens of thousands pieces of information). In this regard, the tax
administrations of developing countries find it difficult to verify the authenticity of these fees. Furthermore,
determining whether the allocation method applied is in accordance with the arm’s length principle is another
practical difficulty since intra-group services are mostly charged applying an indirect charge method utilising various
allocation keys. Due to the fact that most of the parent companies or service centres of multinational enterprises
are located overseas, the local taxpayers can often only provide information regarding their own operations instead
of an overall understanding of the entire intra-group services structure. Potential issues could comprise whether
the subsidiaries in other countries that similarly benefit from the services follow the same methodology to pay the
service fees and the service fees charged to the various subsidiaries.[114]
The SAT recommends that the UN TP Manual require MNEs to provide more relevant transfer pricing documentation
along the line of the country-by-country (CbC) reporting requirement in the BEPS initiative to help resolve this difficulty.
3.6. Documentation and information gathering
In the UN TP Manual and the Response to the UN re Services, China highlights the importance of, and difficulty in,
obtaining information on the Chinese members of an MNE, as well as on the MNE. Asymmetry in information handicaps
tax officials in their investigation of transfer pricing cases. The SAT has, therefore, taken some unilateral and international
steps to address this issue.
Domestically, the SAT has introduced a “carrot and stick” strategy to improve tax compliance. For instance, with regard to
offshore indirect transfers, the gains from the transfer are taxable. Although the transferor is the taxpayer, the transferee
is liable to withhold Chinese taxes from the payments to the transferor, i.e. it acts as the “withholding agent”. If the
withholding agent fails to withhold the taxes in part or in full, the transferor is required to file and pay the taxes and submit
documents relating to the calculation of the taxable gain and taxes payable.[115] If neither the withholding agent nor the
taxpayer complies, the in-charge tax authority may impose penalties on the withholding agent. However, if the withholding
agent has submitted the required documents within 30 days from the date when the equity transfer contract or agreement
is signed, the withholding agent may be exempted from or receive reduced penalties.[116] The Chinese enterprise whose
equity interest was indirectly transferred offshore must report the transaction to the in-charge tax authorities.
The SAT has strengthened the requirement for providing information to avoid GAAR assessment or to obtain treaty relief.
For instance, the GAAR Measures (2015) require taxpayers who are subject to a GAAR investigation to provide the
following material: (1) background materials for the avoidance arrangement; (2) explanatory documentation regarding
the business purpose of the arrangement; (3) materials related to internal strategic decisions and administration; (4)
detailed transactional information related to the arrangement; (5) communications with counterparties; (6) other material
supporting the claim that the arrangement is not a tax avoidance arrangement; and (7) other material deemed necessary
by the in-charge tax authorities.[117] If the taxpayer refuses to provide this information, the in-charge tax authorities assess
114. Id.
115. The in-charge tax authority should report the offshore transfer to the tax authorities within 30 days of the taxes being paid to the state treasury.
116. Article 9 of the Offshore Indirect Transfers Circular (2015), supra n. 25, lists the following documents: (1) an equity transfer contract or
agreement; (2) corporate ownership structure charts before and after the equity transfer; (3) the prior two years of financial and accounting
statements for the offshore enterprise and its underlying affiliates that directly or indirectly hold Chinese taxable property; and (4) a statement of
the reason why the first paragraph of article 1 does not apply to the indirect Chinese taxable property transfer. Chinese translations are required,
together with the original foreign language version, of all this documentation.
117. Art. 11 GAAR Measures, supra n. 24.
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the tax liability using any reasonable method.[118] The in-charge tax authorities also have the power to request any entity
or individual who has planned the tax arrangement for the taxpayer under investigation to provide relevant material and
documentation.[119]
In order to receive treaty relief for beneficial owners of dividends, interest or royalties, the recipient must provide
documentation, including bylaws of the company, financial statements, records of cash flows, minutes of meetings of
the board of directors, resolutions of the board of directors, the assignment of human resources and assets, related
expenses, functions and assumption of risk, loan agreements, licence agreements, transfer contracts, certificate of
registration of patents, evidence of ownership, agency agreements, designated agents for receiving payments, and
similar material.[120] This evidentiary burden is reduced in applying the China-Hong Kong Income Tax Arrangement
(2006).[121]
Internationally, China supports Action 13 on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC reporting. The annual CbC
reporting by MNEs would provide the SAT with data for conducting transfer pricing assessments. China could also obtain
information filed by the ultimate parents of MNEs through the government-to-government exchanges of CbC reports. In
addition, by the end of 2014, China has concluded nine tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) with tax haven
jurisdictions.
On 27 August 2013, China signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (the “Multilateral
Convention”). This is the first time China has signed a multilateral tax instrument. China has also participated in the
development of a new global standard for automatic exchange of financial information, covering bank accounts and other
financial assets held offshore. In 2014, China reached an “in substance” intergovernmental agreement with the United
States on cooperation with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).[122]
4. International implications of China’s BEPS Measures
4.1. China as a norm-shaker
China’s BEPS measures are expected to have some international implications. There is evidence to suggest that China
is becoming important in the international tax system. From the 1980s to the present, China has transformed itself from a
norm-taker to a norm-shaker and may become one of the norm-makers in the near future.
With regard to the BEPS initiative, China not only participated, but also contributed. China is expected to use the
opportunity of hosting the 2016 G20 Summit to address tax matters. China’s influence on BEPS outcomes is presumably
evidenced by inclusion of location savings and specific market advantages in the Action 8 Deliverable (2014). The Action
8 Deliverable recognizes that features of the geographic market in which business operations occur, i.e. location savings
and other local market advantages or disadvantages can affect comparability and arm’s length prices.[123] Market-specific
characteristics are not, however, recognized as intangibles as they cannot be owned or controlled.[124] The following
statements in the Public Discussion Draft on Actions 8, 9 and 10 are generally in line with the Chinese position on location
savings:
[I]n determining how location savings are to be shared between two or more associated enterprises, it is necessary
to consider (i) whether location savings exist; (ii) the amount of any location savings; (iii) the extent to which location
savings are either retained by a member or members of the MNE group or are passed on to independent customers
118. Id., at art. 12.
119. Id., at art. 13.
120. Art. 2 BO Announcement 30, supra n. 52.
121. BO Hong Kong Letter, supra n. 53.
122. P.R.C.-U.S. FATCA Agreement (26 June 2014), Treaties IBFD. See also US Treasury FATCA Resource Centre, U.S. Treasury Department,
available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-Archive.aspx.
123. OECD, Actions 8, 9 and 10: Discussion Draft on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (including Risk, Recharacterization, and
Special Measures) paras. 104-116 (OECD 2015) [hereinafter; “Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10”]; G20/OECD, Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Project, Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, BEPS Action 8 2014 Deliverable, D.6 [hereinafter: “BEPS Action
8 2014 Deliverable”], where it is stated that: “Paragraphs 1.55, 1.57 and 6.31 indicate that features of the geographic market in which business
operations occur can affect comparability and arm’s length prices. Difficult issues can arise in evaluating differences between geographic markets
and in determining appropriate comparability adjustments. Such issues may arise in connection with the consideration of cost savings attributable
to operating in a particular market. Such savings are sometimes referred to as location savings. In other situations comparability issues can arise
in connection with the consideration of local market advantages or disadvantages that may not be directly related to location savings.”
124. OECD, BEPS Action 8 2014 Deliverable, supra n. 123, at para. 6.31.
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or suppliers; and (iv) where location savings are not fully passed on to independent customers or suppliers, the
manner in which independent enterprises operating under similar circumstances would allocate any retained net
location savings.[125]
China’s emphasis on value creation is also consistent with the BEPS initiative as the Action Plan is intended to ensure
that taxation is aligned with substance and transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation.[126] The BEPS
initiative already recognizes that: (1) the “actual contributions, capabilities, and other features of the parties” should be
considered in conducting functional analysis;[127] and (2) in applying profit splits to the value creation by highly integrated
MNEs, the three allocation keys are “production capacity”, “headcount” and “value of production”.[128]
Finally, China’s experience with base erosion issues that are more important to developing and low-income countries
appears to be directly relevant to the work of the G20 and OECD Development Working Group (DWG) in developing
solutions for BEPS problems in these countries. In its two-part report to the DWG,[129] the OECD recognizes the special
concerns and experiences of developing countries, identifies BEPS issues that are of particular importance to these
countries and suggests specific actions to assist developing countries in countering BEPS.
China’s influence on the development of the UN TP Manual is more direct, as a SAT representative has served on the UN
Committee[130] and the transfer pricing subcommittee.[131] Section 10.3 of the UN TP Manual now includes China’s views
on transfer pricing. The forthcoming update, most likely in 2016, is expected to pay attention to China’s recommendations
that the UN TP Manual: (1) refers the relevant requirements in relation to transfer pricing documentation contained in the
Action Plan and requires that the parent company discloses in the Master File the transfer pricing policies for global intra-
group services, the method and the service fees allocated to each subsidiary; and (2) provides additional guidance on
how to differentiate royalties from technical service fees.
4.2. Implications for developing countries
China’s position on intra-group payments is likely to influence other developing countries in strengthening their domestic
anti-avoidance rules to counter BEPS. Since BEPS outcomes may not lead to any immediate measures that can address
the specific needs of developing countries, denying a tax deduction to the payer of service fees or royalties is an easier
and arguably more effective way of protecting the tax base of developing countries. The deduction method is more
suitable to developing counties because:
– It helps overcome the technical issues of establishing an arm’s length price for the intra-group services and the
licensing of intangibles.
– It is arguably superior in protecting the tax base than imposing a withholding tax on intra-group payments. Under the
existing system, withholding taxes are imposed only on royalties. Payments for intra-group services are generally
tax deductible for domestic taxpayers, but not subject to withholding tax. Unless the non-resident company provides
the services through a permanent establishment (PE) in the developing country, profit from the services is free from
tax in that country.
– It is arguably easier than trying to tax the non-resident service provider by revising the PE test.[132]
– It may help to address payments regarding digital transactions without the need to introducing a special PE
threshold for digital transactions.[133]
125. OECD, Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10, supra n. 123, at para. 107.
126. OECD, Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 10, supra n. 86, at para. 34.
127. OECD, Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10, supra n. 123, at para. 17.
128. OECD, Public Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 10, supra n. 86, at para. 37.
129. OECD, Part 1 of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries (OECD 2014) and Part 2 of a
Report to G20 Development Working Group, supra n. 43, available at www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/part-2-of-report-to-g20-dwg-on-the-impact-of-
beps-in-low-income-countries.pdf.
130. Mr Tizhong Liao served as First Vice Chairperson of the UN Committee when the UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital p. viii (1
Jan. 2011), Models IBFD was published.
131. Shanwu Yuan was a member of the transfer pricing subcommittee which drafted the UN TP Manual, supra n. 12, at p. vii.
132. See B.J. Arnold, The Taxation of Income from Services, UN Papers on Selected Topics, in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries Draft
Paper No. 2 (2013), available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/20140604_Paper2_Arnold.pdf.
133. OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 2014 Deliverable (OECD 2014), International Organizations’
Documentation IBFD. For further discussions on the digital economy and developing countries, see J. Li, Protecting the Tax Base in the Digital
Economy (2014), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/20140604_Paper9_Li.pdf.
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5. Conclusions
China’s BEPS measures go beyond the scope of the BEPS initiative. The primary legal instrument is the domestic
GAAR.[134] The SAT relies on the GAAR in addressing base erosion issues relating to the improper use of tax treaties,
the improper use of corporate forms, especially empty shells in tax haven jurisdictions, and indirect transfers of taxable
Chinese property. The SAT also relies on its understanding of the arm’s length principle in dealing with intra-group service
fees, royalties and other forms of transfer pricing practices.[135]
China has high hopes on the outcomes of the BEPS initiative. At the same time, China appears to be realistic regarding
what can be achieved at a global level. The BEPS initiative is not about redesigning the basic international tax rules and
the system continues to be biased in favour of capital exporting countries (CEN), i.e. residence countries. The BEPS
initiative is not designed to rethink the arm’s length principle to assign more value to productive activities and markets in
both developing countries and developed countries. Instead, the BEPS initiative pursues the objective of attributing more
profits to the jurisdiction where intangibles are generated, which are predominantly developed countries.[136]
China has a high stake in the future of the international tax system, as it is both a major recipient of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and a major source of outbound FDI. The BEPS initiative marks the beginning of a process that involves
China. It is uncertain if the G20 and OECD member countries will be able to agree on the recommendations of the BEPS
initiative and introduce the necessary legislative changes to initiate the reforms. It is even more uncertain as to the effect
of the BEPS initiative on developing countries, in spite of the efforts of the UN Subcommittee and the DWG. However, to
the extent that BEPS is shaking up the international tax norm, China is surely an active norm-shaker.
134. The SAT reported this strategy in UN Response re BEPS, supra n. 9.
135. The SAT is expected to update the Special Tax Adjustment Measures, supra n. 28, most of which deals with transfer pricing, in 2015 to
incorporate China’s approaches to LSAs and profit-based methods.
136. The views expressed here are not the “official” views of the SAT. Instead, they are based on discussions in Chinese websites, including Jiang
Speech, supra n. 8.
